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In recent years, the renminbi (RMB) exchange rate and China’s ex-
change rate policy have received the extensive concern of the international
community. Has RMB been undervalued? If so, by how much it is under-
valued? Should RMB be revaluated or appreciated? These questions have
all caused a hot debate at home and abroad. Though there is no unanimous
conclusion on how much RMB is undervalued, it is the more unanimous
view of researchers that RMB is undervalued. For example, Goldstein
(2004) estimates that RMB has been undervalued by 15–30 percent in 2003
according to a simple fundamental equilibrium exchange rate (FEER)
model. Frankel (2004) uses a modiﬁed purchasing power parity method to
estimate that RMB was undervalued by 35 percent in 2000, and judges that
it is undervalued at least that much at present. Shi and Yu (2005) use a be-
havior equilibrium exchange rate (BEER) model to draw that RMB was
undervalued by about 12 percent on average during 2002–2004, and Coud-
ert and Couharde (2005) use a FEER model to estimate that the RMB ex-
change rate was undervalued by 23 percent in 2003.
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nomic Research.misalignment certainly results in a distortion of the economy that exerts a
negative impact on economic structure and macroeconomic performance
of the economy. For example, in recent years, the Chinese economy has
been in a state of obvious external and internal imbalance,1which certainly
has something to do with the undervaluation of RMB. According to the
Swan Diagram, a classic framework for analyzing the macroeconomic pol-
icy of an open economy, allowing RMB to appreciate is a direct and eﬀec-
tive method to resolve the imbalances of the Chinese economy (Shi 2006),
but the Chinese government seems hesitant to allow RMB to appreciate2
and would rather adopt other measures such as adjusting export tax re-
bates, relaxing the controls on capital outﬂow, and adjusting the interest
rate or deposit reserve ratio to deal with external and internal imbalances
of the economy.
Why then, considering that there is obviously an undervaluation of
RMB and that the Chinese economy suﬀers from external and internal im-
balances, does the Chinese government still resist RMB appreciation? Ac-
cording to a traditional macroeconomics textbook model, currency appre-
ciations are contractionary; at least in the short run, appreciations will
raise the price of domestic goods relative to the price of foreign goods
(namely the real exchange rate appreciation), cause exports to drop and
consumers to substitute home produced goods with imported goods, and
thus reduce the aggregate demand.3 So, the hesitation of the Chinese gov-
ernment is consistent with the view of traditional macroeconomic theory.
Though the Chinese government has announced that China does not pur-
sue too big a trade surplus, indicating that the Chinese policymakers would
like to reduce the surplus through various means, the Chinese government
certainly worries that RMB appreciations are contractionary, as tradi-
tional macroeconomic theory states, and thus would have a negative im-
pact on China’s economic growth and employment—even causing the
Chinese economy to fall into a long time recession, as happened in Japan
during the 1990s (as is often, but maybe not correctly, cited by those who
argue against the RMB appreciation). This is the main reason the Chinese
government is unwilling to allow RMB to appreciate. Considering that
there is a high rate of unemployment caused by economic reform and econ-
omy transition into the market economy, maintaining the high rate of eco-
nomic growth and sustaining employment are obviously the higher priori-
ties of the Chinese government.
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1. Speciﬁcally, external imbalance is evidenced by the large current account surplus and a
large growth in foreign exchange reserves; the internal imbalance manifests itself in the over-
heating of the economy and the pressure of inﬂation.
2. Under China’s new exchange rate regime, if the monetary authority reduces the intensity
of exchange market intervention, or widens the band of RMB exchange rate ﬂoating, the mar-
ket will promote RMB to appreciate progressively because of the steady expectation of RMB
appreciation. In this paper, we do not distinguish appreciation from revaluation.
3. This is the expenditure-switching eﬀect of exchange rate change.Must appreciations be contractionary and depreciations expansionary?
For a long time, at least since Hirschman (1949), economists have realized
that appreciations are not necessarily contractionary, nor are deprecia-
tions necessarily expansionary. Marked by Krugman and Taylor (1978),
there appears a so-called contractionary devaluationsliterature.4On the de-
mand side, the literature emphasizes the expenditure-changing eﬀects of
exchange rate change ignored by the traditional macroeconomic theory
and provides a series of mechanisms and channels through which devalua-
tion can cause outputs to drop. On the supply side, the literature demon-
strates the contractionary devaluations eﬀect mainly through the inﬂuence
of devaluation on the cost of imported intermediate goods, the cost of
wages and, ﬁrm’s working capital.5 After the 1994 Mexico currency crisis
and 1997–98 East Asian ﬁnancial crisis, the contractionary devaluations
literature obtained renewed attention of economists (Kamin and Rogers
2000), and has received new development. The new development empha-
sizes the importance of the balance sheet eﬀects in explaining the economic
recession caused by the devaluation in the ﬁnancial crisis (Frankel 2005).
According to the contractionary devaluations literature, currency reval-
uations are likely to have an expansionary rather than a contractionary im-
pact on the economy in developing countries. For instance, currency reval-
uation has real cash balance eﬀect and real wealth eﬀect: It lowers the
domestic price level, therefore leading to real cash balance and real wealth
increase, which tends to expand personal spending (Bruno 1979, Gylfason
and Radetzki 1991). Currency revaluation also has an income reallocation
eﬀect (Diaz-Alejandro 1963, Cooper 1971, Krugman and Taylor 1978): it
tends to transfer real income from groups with high marginal propensity
to saving toward groups with low marginal propensity to saving, causing
total domestic expenditure to expand. This is because revaluation raises
the real wage through reducing the price level, causing the real income to
shift from entrepreneur to the laborer, and the laborer has higher marginal
propensity to consume than that of entrepreneur. This income reallocation
eﬀect may be remarkable in developing countries, because the laborers in
developing countries usually have limited wealth and are subject to strong
liquidity constraint, so their marginal propensities to consume are nearly
equal to 1. Moreover, in developing countries, new equipment investment
usually includes a large amount of imported capital goods, and currency
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4. This literature is mainly about the exchange rate policy of developing countries. Devalu-
ations are usually included in stabilization programs of developing countries and the balance
of payment problems in developing countries generally are devaluation pressure. Therefore,
the contractionary devaluations literature mainly investigates the issue of devaluation. How-
ever, many channels of the contractionary devaluations are equally suitable to the issue of
revaluation.
5. See Lizondo and Montiel (1989) for a survey of contractionary devaluations literature.
Caves, Frankel, and Jones (2002) provide a simple introduction of ten kinds of contractionary
devaluations eﬀects.revaluation will lower domestic prices of those goods, which will help to
expand investment expenditure and, therefore, total expenditure (Branson
1986, van Wijnbergen 1986).6 Finally, currency revaluation will lower the
domestic prices of imported intermediate goods and raw materials (such as
petroleum and minerals) which, in turn, will lower the production costs 
of all ﬁnal goods (including nontradable goods) and the lowering of mar-
ginal costs relative to the prices of ﬁnal goods will lead to increased out-
put and employment (Bruno 1979, van Wijnbergen 1986). Therefore, even
if the net eﬀect of revaluation on aggregate demand is contractionary (the
expenditure-switching eﬀect is large enough to dominate the expenditure-
changing eﬀect), the existing supply side eﬀect may still make the revalua-
tion expansionary.
Regarding the empirical literature, the majority of research on the rela-
tionship between the real exchange rate and output in developing countries
has demonstrated that real devaluations are contractionary while real ap-
preciations were expansionary, suggesting that the channels the contrac-
tionary devaluations literature revealed are important in developing coun-
tries. For example, in an inﬂuential early research Edwards (1986) used a
reduced form equation model to study a panel data set of 12 developing
countries, and found that devaluations were contractionary in the short-
term, but turned out to be expansionary after one year, and were neutral 
in the long-term. Gylfason and Radetzki (1991) used a macroeconomic
simulation method to ﬁnd that for the 12 developing countries studied, 
devaluations were all contractionary in the short-term as well as in the 
mid-term. Kamin and Rogers (2000) used a vector autoregression model 
(VAR model) to study the relation between real exchange rate and output
in Mexico, and found that real devaluations were contractionary while real
appreciations were expansionary. Other recent researches, such as Hoﬀ-
maister and Vegh (1996) on Uruguay, Moreno (1999) on six East Asian
countries, Akinlo and Odusola (2003) on Nicaragua, and Berument and
Pasaogullari (2003) on Turkey, all support the contractionary devaluations
hypothesis.
What is the relationship between RMB real exchange rate and China’s
output then? Are RMB appreciations contractionary as the textbook says,
or expansionary as the contractionary devaluations hypothesis suggests?
The purpose of this paper is to study the eﬀects of RMB real exchange rate
on China’s output by using VAR models with a sample of 1991q1–2005q3.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 gives a brief histor-
ical review of China’s exchange rate regime, the evaluations of the RMB
real exchange rate, and China’s output during the past decade, in order to
provide a background for the issues to be discussed; section 3 describes the
models to be employed and the data to be used, and discusses the time se-
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6. Those are the expenditure-changing eﬀects of exchange rate change.ries characteristics of the variables; section 4 takes an econometric analysis
of the VAR models through impulse-response function graphs and vari-
ance decompositions of forecast errors; and ﬁnally, section 5 summarizes
the conclusions drawn from this research.
3.2 A Brief History of RMB Exchange Rate Evaluation 
and China’s Output Fluctuation: 1991–2005
In the early part of the 1990s, China implemented a double exchange
rate system; an oﬃcial ﬁxed exchange rate coexisted with a market ex-
change rate formed in the swap foreign exchange market. By 1992, up to 80
percent of the foreign exchange transactions were conducted at the swap
foreign exchange market and the market exchange rate essentially reﬂected
the demand for and the supply of the foreign exchange. Because the swap
market exchange rate was higher than oﬃcial exchange rate, implying a
subsidy to exporters, the double exchange rate system caused unfair com-
petition and resource distortion, and was unfavorable for attracting for-
eign direct investments.7 Against these negative eﬀects, the oﬃcial ex-
change rate of RMB was increasing (devaluating) constantly, from 4.7
yuan per U.S. dollar in 1990, devalued to 5.4 yuan per dollar in 1992, until
it reached 5.8 yuan per dollar by the end of 1993. On January 1, 1994,
China reformed its double exchange rate system by unifying the two ex-
change rates and established a single and managed ﬂoating exchange rate
system based on market supply and demand. Afterward, the nominal rate
of RMB had gone through disconnected, small bouts of appreciation, and
this course went on until 1997 and the ﬁnancial crisis of East Asia.
When the external demand dropped and the currencies of China’s prin-
cipal trade partners devalued against the U.S. dollar by a wide margin 
(except Hong Kong), the market participators generally anticipated that
RMB would follow those currencies and devaluate. In order to stabilize the
regional exchange rates and prevent the currencies from competitive de-
valuation, the Chinese government announced against the market expec-
tation that RMB would not be devalued. From then on, the RMB exchange
rate was ﬁxed at 8.28 yuan per U.S. dollar, and the so-called managed ﬂoat
became a de facto dollar peg. This system lasted until July of 2005. On July
21, 2005, China instituted a reform of its exchange rate regime by revalu-
ating the RMB by 2.1 percent and terminating its peg to the U.S. dollar in
favor of a managed ﬂoat based on a basket of currencies. Under the new
exchange rate regime, the daily ﬂuctuation of RMB exchange rate is re-
stricted within 0.3 percent on both sides, and the RMB exchange rate has
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7. Under this kind of system, the foreign investment must be converted into RMB accord-
ing to the oﬃcial exchange rate ﬁrst. When the foreign investors need foreign exchanges, how-
ever, they can only obtain them through the foreign exchange swap market, at the market ex-
change rate.not moved very much because of the market intervention conducted by the
People’s Bank of China (PBOC). Figure 3.1 portrays the track of RMB
nominal exchange rate against the U.S. dollar during the past sixteen years.
In contrast with the relative stableness of the bilateral nominal rate of
RMB, the real eﬀective exchange rate (hereafter referred to as the real ex-
change rate) of RMB presented a large ﬂuctuation in the past periods of
more than ten years. As can be seen from ﬁgure 3.2, the real exchange rate
of RMB had gone through six diﬀerent stages. (a) 1991q1–1993q2—the
real exchange rate of RMB experienced a large amount of depreciation,
mainly because the nominal rate of RMB had presented a large devalua-
tion; (b) 1993q3–1998q1—the real exchange rate of RMB experienced a
large amount of appreciation, mainly because of higher inﬂation in China
during the period and a small appreciation of RMB nominal rate. After the
ﬁnancial crisis of East Asia, the appreciation of RMB real exchange rate
was due to the sharp devaluations of the currencies of some China’s trade
partners. (c) 1998q2–1999q4—the real exchange rate of RMB experienced
a certain degree of depreciation, mainly because there appeared to be a 
deﬂation in China; (d) 2000q1–2002q1—a certain degree of appreciation
of RMB real exchange rate appeared in this period, mainly the reﬂection
of mild inﬂation in China and a deﬂation in the trade partners in this pe-
riod. The real exchange rate of RMB of 2002q1 rebounded to the level of
1997q4. (e) 2002q2–2005q1—the real exchange rate of RMB turned to the
course of large depreciation, mainly inﬂuenced by the fact that the U.S.
dollar depreciated largely against Euro, Japanese yen, and other key cur-
rencies, so RMB also depreciated largely against those currencies; (f)
2005q2 and q3—subject to the inﬂuence of appreciation of the U.S. dollar
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Fig. 3.1 RMB nominal exchange rate (yuan/U.S. dollar)
Source: IMF, International Financial Statisticsagainst the Euro and Japanese yen, the RMB real exchange rate turned to
an appreciation state again.
By investigating the detrended real output data of China, we can ﬁnd
that China’s real output also experienced a large ﬂuctuation over the past
ten plus years. Concerning the correlation of the two variables, as ﬁgure 3.2
shows, during the whole sample period (1991q1–2005q3) the relationship
between the RMB real exchange rate and China’s cyclical output is not
very clear, but since 2000q1 the two have presented an obvious negative
correlation; namely, appreciations of the real exchange rate have been as-
sociated with falls of the cyclical outputs, while real depreciations have
been followed by expansions of the cyclical output. The relation between
RMB real exchange rate and China’s output accords with the forecast of
the traditional open economy macroeconomics—RMB appreciations are
contractionary, while RMB depreciations are expansionary.
However, for the shown correlation between the RMB real rate and
China’s output in ﬁgure 3.2, two issues are still needed to be clariﬁed: First,
may the tight correlation between the RMB real rate and China’s output be
spurious? That is, is it just reﬂecting the response of both variables to the
third external variable, and do the two variables have nothing to do with
each other? For example, a change in government spending will inﬂuence
the real exchange rate while inﬂuencing aggregate demand. Models in the
Mundell-Fleming tradition predict that an increase in government spend-
ing raises the real interest rate and leads to an appreciation of the real ex-
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Fig. 3.2 RMB real exchange rate and real GDP
Note: REER stands for RMB real exchange rate index with a rise indicating an appreciation.
GDP stands for detrended real gross domestic product. See section 3 for the deﬁnition and
explanation of the variables.change rate.8 Second, if real exchange rate and output are really relevant,
what then is the causality between them? In other words, does the change
of the real exchange rate of RMB cause the change of output, or, con-
versely, does the change of the output cause the change of the real exchange
rate of RMB? In order to draw the answers to the above-mentioned ques-
tions, we employ a preliminarily pairwise Granger causality test to exam-
ine the Granger causality between the RMB real rate and China’s output.
The Granger causality tests will indicate whether a set of lagged variables
has explanatory power on the other variables. If the computed F-statistics
are signiﬁcant, we can claim in Granger’s sense that one variable does cause
the other variable.
Table 3.1 reports the results of the Granger causality test. The result of
the test on the whole sample (1991q1–2005q3) shows that, with a 95 per-
cent level of conﬁdence, the sample data reject the null hypothesis, indicat-
ing that China’s output Granger causes the RMB real rate, and the RMB
real rate Granger causes the output as well. Because there seems a diﬀer-
ence on the relationship between RMB real rate and China’s output before
and after 2000q1, we divide the whole sample into two subsamples
(1991q1–1999q4 and 2000q1–2005q3) and conduct a Granger causality
test on the two subsamples separately. The results turn out to be surprise.
For the ﬁrst subsample, the data reject the null hypothesis with a 99 percent
level of conﬁdence, suggesting the output Granger causes the real ex-
change rate, and the real exchange rate Granger causes the outputs as well.
For the second subsample, upon which there seems to be a strong correla-
tion between the output and real exchange rate, the date instead cannot re-
ject the null hypothesis, showing the strange result that the output does not
Granger cause the real exchange rate and the real exchange rate does not
Granger cause the outputs either. That means no variable is helpful in ex-
plaining the movement of the other. One explanation to this strange-
looking result may be that the number of observations in the second sub-
sample is too small, resulting in a small F-Statistic. Another explanation
may be that there are other variables inﬂuencing both RMB real rate and
China’s output at the same time that has limited the usefulness for the pair-
wise Granger causality test.
So, in order to investigate the relationship between the RMB real ex-
change rate and China’s output more precisely, we employ VAR models to
control the inﬂuence of variables that may have impacts on both RMB real
exchange rate and China’s output, in order to answer the above-mentioned
questions. The estimated VAR models also let us study other interesting
issues.
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8. The sticky-price intertemporal models of the New Open Economy Macroeconomics pre-
dict a fall in the real interest rate in response to an increase in government spending (Obstfeld
and Rogoﬀ 1995), hence a depreciation of the real exchange rate.3.3 Model and Data
3.3.1 The Models
We use the VAR model to study the relationship between the real ex-
change rate of RMB and China’s output in order to ﬁnd out whether the
correlation indicated by ﬁgure 3.2 is spurious or not, and the direction of
causality between the real exchange rate and output in China. Owing to the
relatively small sample size, we can’t include all interested variables within
one VAR model,9 so we adopt the modeling strategy of Kamin and Rogers
(2000) as follows: we estimate a basic model at ﬁrst, and then expand the
basic model by entering another external variable to the basic model each
time. Following Kamin and Rogers (2000), the basic model includes
China’s gross domestic product (GDP), RMB real eﬀective exchange rate
(REER), China’s inﬂation rate (INFL) and foreign gross domestic product
(GDPF). Following the tradition of business cycle literature, we detrend
the data of gross domestic product so as to focus upon the growth cycle.
Therefore, GDP and GDPF represent the cyclical components of gross do-
mestic product (or GDP gap) of China and foreign countries respectively.
The reasons for selecting these four variables are as follows: GDPF is taken
as a proxy of external shocks. This variable lets us examine the eﬀect on
Chinese economy of external shocks. GDP and REER are the variables we
want to study. INFL is the intermediate variable in between the real ex-
change rate and output, proxying all possible channels link the real ex-
change rate to output. Being diﬀerent from Kamin and Rogers (2000), we
choose GDPF instead of the U.S. interest rate as the proxy of external fac-
tors. This is based on the following consideration: China still implements
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9. Because a VAR model involves quite a lot of parameters to be estimated, introducing too
many endogenous variables will cause serious loss in the degrees of freedom, thus aﬀecting
the statistic dependability of the results.
Table 3.1 Pairwise Granger causality tests
Null Hypothesis Obs. F-Statistic Probability
Sample: 1991Q1–2005Q3
GDP does not Granger Cause REER 55 2.65 0.04
REER does not Granger Cause GDP 2.85 0.03
Subsample: 1991Q1–1999Q4
GDP does not Granger Cause REER 32 3.69 0.02
REER does not Granger Cause GDP 9.38 0.00
Subsample: 2000Q1–2005Q3
GDP does not Granger Cause REER 23 0.86 0.51
REER does not Granger Cause GDP 0.52 0.72the capital controls, therefore, the relation between the U.S. interest rate
and China’s interest rate should not be very close. On the other hand, after
fulﬁlling the RMB convertible for current account transactions and for-
mally joining the World Trade Organization, the openness of China’s real
economy is increasing constantly, and the ratio of foreign trade to GDP in
China has reached a level of 70 percent at present. In this situation, the
business cycles of trading partners have important inﬂuence on China
through the channels of import and export.
The basic model is too parsimonious to allow us to investigate more
comprehensive inﬂuences of the variables that inﬂuence both the real ex-
change rate and the output; it may not be very eﬃcient to study the prob-
lem of spurious correlation. For example, it provides us with little sense of
which channels link the real exchange rate to output. Therefore, we enter
one endogenous variable into the basic model each time, and estimate
other VAR models in addition. That lets us see whether our ﬁnal results are
robust or not, and at the same time lets us control the size of the VAR
model within the appropriate level according to the sample. We enter gov-
ernment spending (GOV) and money supply (M2) into the basic model re-
spectively to examine ﬁscal and monetary channels in the relationship be-
tween real exchange rate and output. In addition, we enter the U.S. interest
rate (RUS) so as to investigate the international ﬁnancial linkage of Chi-
nese economy and examine the eﬃciency of capital controls in China.
Therefore, besides the basic model that is indicated as model 1, we further
estimate three more VAR models. The models can be expressed in the form







t i   εl
t, εl
t ~ IID[ol,  l], l   1  ,   4  
where,
Y t
1   (GDPFt, INFLt, REERt, GDPt) ,
Y t
2   (GDPFt, INFLt, GOVt, REERt, GDPt) ,
Y t
3   (GDPFt, M2t, INFLt, REERt, GDPt) , 
Y t
4   (RUSt, GDPFt, INFLt, REERt, GDPt) ,
kl indicates the lags of l-th VAR model. Al
t is parameter matrix of l-th VAR
model for i   1, 2, . . . , kl, εl
t is a random residual vector of l-th VAR 
model, ol is the zero mean vector of εl
t, and  l is a covariance matrix of εl
t.
Accordingly to AIC criterion and SC criterion, the diﬀerent numbers of
lags are tried for each VAR model, and the optimum lags turn out to be 4
for all four models.
We take the familiar two-stage approach to estimate the VAR models. At
the ﬁrst stage, the variables are regressed on lags of all the variables in the
80 Jianhuai Shisystem, and at the second stage, the Cholesky decomposition technique
used by Sims (1980) is employed to orthogonalize the residuals so as to
identify the primitive structural system. The Cholesky decomposition im-
poses a recursive contemporaneous causal structure on the VAR models.
The model variables are ordered in a particular sequence, and variables
higher in the ordering are assumed to cause contemporaneous changes in
variables lower in the ordering. Variables lower in the ordering are assumed
to aﬀect variables higher in the ordering only with a lag. Because of this,
determining a reasonable order for endogenous variables is an important
issue in employing a VAR model. We select the variable orders of our four
models as above, and the rationale for the orderings are as follows.
GDPF is ordered ﬁrst because GDPF captures the external shocks that
may have signiﬁcant contemporaneous eﬀects on Chinese economic vari-
ables like INFL, REER, and GDP due to the openness of Chinese econ-
omy. On the other hand, the outputs of China’s trade partners as a whole
are unlikely aﬀected contemporaneously by any Chinese economic vari-
ables. For REER, INFL, and GDP, we adopt an ordering a little bit dif-
ferent from that of Kamin and Rogers (2000);10 we order INFL prior to
REER and GDP by assuming that inﬂation shocks have a contemporane-
ous eﬀect on RMB real exchange rate (since RMB nominal exchange rate
is stable due to high oﬃcial intervention) and on aggregate demand. In
contrast, we assume that price is sticky in the short run, so it responds to
real exchange rate and aggregate demand shocks only with lags. REER is
ordered prior to GDP, as we assume that real exchange rate shocks have a
contemporaneous eﬀect on aggregate demand through traditional channel
or those indicated by the contractionary devaluations literature, while ag-
gregate demand shocks do not aﬀect contemporaneously the real exchange
rate. In model 2, GOV is ordered after INFL by assuming that government
spending shocks aﬀect inﬂation only with a lag. In model 3, M2 is ordered
prior to INFL under the assumption that as the monetary policy instru-
ment in China, money supply reacts not to realized inﬂation but to ex-
pected inﬂation. In model 4, RUS is ordered prior to GDPF because U.S.
interest rate shocks aﬀect contemporaneously the world aggregate de-
mand, but due to the relative closeness of U.S. economy, the U.S. interest
rate is unlikely aﬀected contemporaneously by world aggregate demand
and any Chinese economic variables.
3.3.2 The Data
The data are quarterly; the sample interval is 1991q1–2005q3. 1991q1 is
the earliest time for which the quarterly gross domestic product data are
available in China. The gross domestic product data of 2005q4 is collected
according to a new statistical method and without comparability with the
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10. Kamin and Rogers (2000) adopt following ordering: REER → INFL → GDP.data in the past, and therefore we exclude it from our sample. Except for in-
ﬂation rate, variables are the real ones. U.S. real interest rate is obtained by
subtracting the U.S. inﬂation rate from the nominal interest rate, and other
real variables are drawn from the nominal ones divided by consumer price
index. The base period is 1992.
The foreign gross domestic product index, GDPF, is calculated accord-
ing to the trade-weighted average of the gross domestic product indices of
14 principal trade partners of China. GDP and GDPF are detrended gross
domestic products. In business cycle literature, the Hodrick-Prescott (H-P)
ﬁlter is widely used to generate the cyclical components. It is well known,
however, that the H-P ﬁlter has an end-of-sample problem, that is, at the
end of the sample the estimates are particular unreliable. In addition, the
ﬁlter depends on the choice of the “smoothness parameter” which makes
the resulting cyclical component and its statistical properties highly sensi-
tive to this choice. Those problems become serious when sample size is
small. Because of the relatively small sample we have, we do not use the H-
P ﬁlter in this study. Instead, we use quadratic detrending to construct
GDP and GDPF data, which is implemented by regressing the logarithm
of quarterly real gross domestic product on a trend and its quadrate. The
regression with a quadratic time trend has higher degree of ﬁt than one
with a linear time trend in our case.
REER (RMB real eﬀective exchange rate index) is taken from the Inter-
national Financial Statistics database of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), a rise in REER indicating an appreciation. China’s inﬂation rate,
INFL, is obtained by diﬀerencing the logarithm of consumer price index.
GOV expresses the Chinese government spending. M2 is China’s broad
money supply. RUS indicates the U.S. real interest rate of three-month
treasury bills. Except for INFL and RUS, variables are in the logarithm.
GDP, GOV, INFL, and GDPF have been seasonally adjusted. Data of
other countries or regions come from the International Financial Statistics
database of IMF. The data of China’s variables, except REER, come from
the State Statistics Bureau, the People’s Bank of China, China’s Ministry
of Finance, and General Customs of China. Taiwan GDP annual data
come from the IMF World Economic Outlook Database 2006, which have
been translated into quarterly data.
3.3.3 The Time Series Characteristics of the Data
Because many macroeconomic variables are not stationary, to avoid
spurious regressions we need to test if the time series of relevant variables
in our models are stationary or not. If the variables turn out to be nonsta-
tionary, we further need to know whether there exist long run steady rela-
tions among those endogenous variables or not. We take the unit root tests
and cointegration tests for those purposes below.
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We use both the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and the Phillips-
Perron test for unit root tests. Table 3.2 reports the results of the unit root
tests of all relevant variables in our models. For the level variables, both
tests reveal that we cannot reject the presence of a unit root, which shows
these variables are all nonstationary. On the other hand, the Phillips-
Perron test rejects the null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root at the 
1 percent level of signiﬁcance for the ﬁrst diﬀerence of all variables, while
the ADF test rejects the null hypothesis at the 1 percent level of signiﬁcance
for the ﬁrst diﬀerence of all variables except GDP. The ADF test cannot re-
ject the presence of a unit root for the ﬁrst diﬀerence time series of GDP.
Here, we adopt the result of the Phillips-Perron test for GDP, and therefore
assert that all variables in our models are the ﬁrst order integrated vari-
ables, namely variables of I (1).
Cointegration Tests
Because all variables in our models are variables of I (1), we need to fur-
ther test if there are cointegration vectors for each model. We implement
VAR-based cointegration tests using the methodology developed in Jo-
hansen (1995). Table 3.3 reports the results of Johansen cointegration tests,
which indicate that there is at least one cointegration vector for each VAR
model. Therefore nonstationary data needs less concern in this study. In
fact, as elaborated in Sims, Stock, and Watson (1990), when variables are
cointegrated using a VAR in levels model is not misspeciﬁed, and the esti-
mates are consistent. Some economists suggest that when one really
doesn’t know whether there is cointegration or what the cointegration vec-
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Table 3.2 Unit root tests
Level First Difference
ADF Test Phillips-Perron Test ADF Test Phillips-Perron Test
GDP –1.53* –1.45* –1.88* –9.26**
REER –1.27* –1.37* –5.56** –5.69**
INFL –1.24* –1.89* –12.00** –11.38**
GDPF –2.26* –2.64*** –7.00** –7.02**
GOV 1.12* 1.21* –6.10** –10.10**
M2 0.20* –0.44* –3.91** –6.01**
RUS –1.61* –1.87* –6.42** –6.44**
* denotes that the hypothesis that the variable contain unit root cannot be rejected at the 10
per cent level of signiﬁcance.
** denotes the rejection of the hypothesis that the variable contain unit root at the 1 per cent
level of signiﬁcance.
*** denotes that the hypothesis that the variable contain unit root cannot be rejected at the 5
per cent level of signiﬁcance.tor is, the VAR in levels approach is probably better than the approach that
tests for cointegration, estimates cointegrating relations, and then esti-
mates a vector error correction (VEC) model (Cochrane 2005). We follow
the suggestion and conduct our study on the relationship between RMB
real exchange rate and China’s output by using VAR in levels model in the
next section.
3.4 Empirical Results
This section comprises two subsections. The ﬁrst subsection presents the
empirical results derived from our VAR in levels models. The estimation
results of the VAR models are given in the form of impulse response func-
tions and variance decompositions, and based on those, the empirical
analysis of the relationship between RMB real exchange rate and China’s
output is then conducted. In the second subsection, the robustness of the
results obtained in the ﬁrst subsection is investigated by adopting diﬀerent
ordering of variables, using VEC model speciﬁcation, and substituting
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Table 3.3 Cointegration tests for alternative speciﬁcations
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue  -Trace Statistics  -Max Statistics
Model 1: Series: GDPF INFL REER GDP
None 0.68 94.67* 62.30*
At most 1 0.26 32.38* 16.73
At most 2 0.19 15.65* 11.54
At most 3 0.07 4.11* 4.11*
Model 2: Series: GDPF INFL GOV REER GDP
None 0.70 149.45* 65.79*
At most 1 0.56 83.66* 45.72*
At most 2 0.35 37.95* 23.93*
At most 3 0.17 14.01 10.02
At most 4 0.07 4.00* 4.00*
Model 3: Series: GDPF M2 INFL REER GDP
None 0.69 137.91* 63.97*
At most 1 0.62 73.94* 52.53*
At most 2 0.25 21.42 15.68
At most 3 0.10 5.73 5.70
At most 4 0.00 0.03 0.03
Model 4: Series: RUS GDPF INFL REER GDP
None 0.70 154.51* 66.46*
At most 1 0.67 88.04* 60.79*
At most 2 0.27 27.25 17.00
At most 3 0.15 10.25 8.79
At most 4 0.03 1.47 1.47
Note: Lags interval (in ﬁrst difference): 1 to 3.
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level of signiﬁcance.RUS for GDPF in the ﬁrst three models as a proxy of external shock. We
want to know whether the results change signiﬁcantly or not when we
make those changes.
3.4.1 Results from the VAR in Levels Model
In a VAR analysis, the dynamic interactions between the variables are
usually investigated by impulse response functions or forecast error vari-
ance decompositions. In this subsection, we obtain our empirical results
concerning the relationship between RMB real exchange rate and China’s
output by using these two instruments.
Impulse Response Functions
The impulse response functions (IRFs) display the responses of a par-
ticular variable to a one-time shock in each of the variables in the system.
Figure 3.3and ﬁgure 3.4 plot the IRFs of GDP and REER respectively cal-
culated from four VAR models. By investigating those IRFs graphs, the
following results can be drawn:
First, when one standard deviation positive (appreciation) shock to
REER takes place, there is an obvious decline of GDP, indicating that
RMB real rate shocks have a negative impact on China’s output. From the
8th quarter, the contractionary eﬀect is weakened to some extent but obvi-
ously still exists. After 18 quarters, the impact of RMB real rate shock on
output turns to be positive. This eﬀect of RMB real appreciation occurs in
all models estimated, suggesting the robustness of the result. This result is
in contrast with that of, say, Edwards (1986) and Kamin and Rogers (2000).
In Edwards (1986), for 12 countries studied, devaluations (revaluations)
were contractionary (expansionary) in the short-term, but after one year
devaluations turned out to be expansionary. In Kamin and Rogers (2000)
devaluations (revaluations) were contractionary (expansionary) in short-
term as well as in medium-term in Mexico.
Second, in model 4, which includes RUS, the contractionary eﬀect of
positive shocks to REER on GDP is signiﬁcantly less than that in other
three models that do not include RUS. The former is only about half of the
latter. On the other hand, shocks to RUS have a remarkable contractionary
eﬀect on GDP; the magnitude of the eﬀect is even larger than that of REER
shocks. These two ﬁndings seem to indicate that on one hand the capital
control in China is less eﬃcient than we thought. On the other, capital
ﬂows have a signiﬁcant impact on the Chinese economy, which is even
larger than the impact of trade (the impact of REER) on the economy.11
In other words, after accounting for the eﬀect of international ﬁnance 
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11. The impact of a rise in RUS on the Chinese economy may function through the follow-
ing channel: a rise in RUS results in a decline in U.S. demands, which in turn causes the de-
mand for China’s export to decline. But because we have entered GDPF into model 4, the in-







































































































































.linkage, the eﬀect of RMB real appreciation on China’s real economy may
be smaller than what we have expected.
Third, one standard deviation shock to GDP has no obvious impact on
REER. After the 3rd quarter, the shock causes REER raise for some ex-
tent. This eﬀect of output shock occurs in all models estimated, suggesting
the robustness of the result. Because the measure of the IRFs graphs of
REER is only about one tenth relative to the measure of those of GDP, we
think that the magnitude of impact of output shocks on RMB real rate is
much less than that of the impact of RMB real rate shocks on output.
Fourth, the impact of shocks to other variables virtually accords with
the economic intuition. For example, an increase in money supply has an
obvious expansionary eﬀect and causes the real exchange rate depreciation
in short-term. GDPF shocks have expansionary eﬀect too; an increases in
government spending results in RMB real appreciation in ﬁrst 2 quarters,
and inﬂation shocks cause a decline of GDP in short-term. An important
exception is the eﬀect of INFL shocks on REER. An increase in inﬂation
causes real exchange rate depreciation. We should expect that an increase
in inﬂation causes the RMB real exchange rate to appreciate, because the
nominal rate of RMB has been very steady since 1997. In addition, an in-
crease in government spending causes GDP to drop in the ﬁrst two quar-
ters. One possible explanation of this may be that in the short run govern-
ment spending has a strong crowding-out eﬀect in China.
In summary, the analyses based on IRFs suggest that the RMB real ap-
preciation shock has contractionary eﬀect on China’s output. After con-
trolling the inﬂuence of other variables, the RMB real appreciation shock
still causes GDP to decline, which excludes the spurious correlation be-
tween RMB real exchange rate and China’s output. The empirical results
also seem to support the guess that the direction of the causality between
the RMB real rate and China’s output runs from the former to the latter.
Finally, the external shocks have remarkable eﬀects on China’s output. In
particular, U.S. interest rate shocks have a signiﬁcant impact on China’s
cyclical output. When the eﬀect of RUS is included in VAR model, the
eﬀect of REER turns out to be weaker for certain degree.
Variance Decompositions
The IRFs provide a useful tool to assess the direction as well as the mag-
nitude of response of a variable to various kinds of shocks. However, the
variance decompositions give the fraction of the forecast error variance for
each variable that is attributable to its own shocks and to shocks in the
other variables in the system, so allow us to appraise the relative impor-
tance of the contribution of diﬀerent shocks to the variance of a particular
variable. Table 3.4 provides the variance decompositions of GDP and
RMB real exchange rate from four VAR models. The following results
emerge from table 3.4.
88 Jianhuai ShiTable 3.4 Variance decompositions of GDP and REER from VAR models
T S.E. GDPF INFL REER GDP
Model 1
1 0.9 0.6 4.6 0.8 2.4 1.4 30.7 97.8 62.3 0.0
2 1.2 0.7 3.3 1.0 2.9 5.1 33.0 93.4 60.8 0.5
3 1.5 0.7 4.9 1.8 2.6 6.1 40.3 89.9 52.2 2.2
4 1.6 0.7 7.1 1.5 2.5 8.6 44.5 83.1 45.9 6.8
8 1.8 1.3 5.0 2.0 3.0 14.8 63.4 65.8 28.5 17.4
12 1.8 1.6 4.4 2.0 4.9 16.5 68.1 53.8 22.6 27.7
20 1.9 1.8 3.9 1.7 8.2 15.2 63.2 49.4 24.8 33.8
T S.E. GDPF INFL REER GDP GOV
Model 2
1 1.0 0.6 8.4 0.8 0.0 0.2 36.7 96.0 47.5 0.0 7.3 3.1
2 1.3 0.6 6.7 1.0 0.2 1.3 43.2 96.3 43.1 0.0 6.9 1.4
3 1.5 0.7 11.0 2.0 0.3 2.0 50.6 94.3 32.9 0.0 5.1 1.8
4 1.7 0.8 16.0 2.0 0.3 3.2 51.4 91.7 26.7 0.9 5.7 2.4
8 1.8 1.2 16.0 2.1 0.7 6.6 68.0 85.9 12.3 2.6 3.5 2.7
12 1.9 1.4 14.0 4.0 1.7 8.4 72.4 78.8 8.1 6.2 3.9 2.6
20 2.1 1.8 13.0 15.6 3.5 5.2 70.2 68.6 8.4 6.0 5.3 4.7
T S.E. GDPF INFL REER GDP M2
Model 3
1 1.0 0.0 5.8 0.5 1.6 1.4 29.4 96.3 48.2 0.0 15.0 1.8
2 1.3 0.0 3.9 0.3 2.1 6.8 30.7 88.0 37.3 0.3 25.9 4.5
3 1.5 0.0 5.3 0.4 1.8 7.9 36.4 82.3 27.6 0.7 28.9 8.8
4 1.7 0.0 7.3 0.3 1.9 8.7 37.9 78.6 22.5 2.1 30.4 10.2
8 1.8 0.0 6.1 0.5 4.8 12.0 51.5 72.5 9.9 4.3 27.7 10.7
12 1.9 0.1 4.6 3.1 7.5 12.1 54.8 66.8 7.3 6.4 25.8 11.6
20 2.1 0.1 6.5 5.5 9.0 8.9 52.3 59.9 7.8 4.0 24.4 21.6
T S.E. GDPF INFL REER GDP RUS
Model 4
1 0.5 1.0 13.2 2.6 0.7 8.2 12.4 85.3 61.9 0.0 11.8 3.9
2 0.8 1.2 10.5 3.4 0.5 13.3 10.7 77.1 53.5 1.5 24.7 4.7
3 0.9 1.5 14.8 5.5 0.8 12.2 11.2 70.7 42.8 3.7 30.4 7.9
4 1.0 1.7 18.5 4.7 1.1 13.1 9.5 63.9 35.1 6.3 35.8 12.0
8 1.2 1.8 14.8 6.3 0.6 15.1 9.3 54.6 16.3 8.6 58.9 15.4
12 1.4 1.9 10.2 5.6 2.2 16.5 7.8 52.6 11.3 12.1 68.5 13.1
20 1.7 2.0 12.0 4.1 4.1 13.5 6.6 40.4 12.8 11.6 64.6 30.4
Notes: The two columns below a variable give the fraction of the forecast error variance for GDP and
REER that is attributable to shocks to the variable at the given forecast horizon, with the bold column
in left indicating the fraction for GDP. The columns below “S.E.” contain the forecast error of GDP and
REER at the given forecast horizon.First, concerning the source of variation in GDP forecast error, for those
models that do not include RUS, “own shocks” is the ﬁrst most important
source at the horizons of the ﬁrst and second quarters, while RMB real ex-
change rate shock is the second most important source. Beginning from the
third quarter, however, the RMB real exchange rate shocks become the ﬁrst
most important source of variation in GDP, and accounts for 36–70 per-
cent of the GDP forecast error variance in models 2 and 3. In the medium
and long-term horizon, “own shocks” is the second most important source
in model 1, which accounts for about 24 percent of the GDP error variance,
while the contributions of “own shocks” in model 2 and 3 decrease greatly,
and only account for about 8 percent of the GDP error variance. In con-
trast, shocks to GDPF and M2 turn out to be the second most important
source of the GDP error variance in model 2 and 3 respectively, in the
medium and long-term horizon, and account for about 14 percent and 26
percent of the GDP error variance respectively.
Second, in model 4, which includes RUS, “own shocks” to GDP is the
ﬁrst most important source of the GDP error variance only at the horizons
of the ﬁrst, second, and third quarters. Beginning from the 4th quarter,
however, the RUS shocks become the ﬁrst most important and predomi-
nant source of variation in GDP, accounting for 36–69 percent of the GDP
error variance, while in the long-term horizon “own shocks” and GDPF
shocks turn to be second and the third most important source of the GDP
error variance, accounting for about 13 percent and 11 percent respec-
tively. In contrast, REER shocks become the fourth important source of
variation in GDP, only accounting for 7 percent of variation in the long-
term horizon. When RUS is included in VAR model, the power of REER
shocks in explaining the error variance of GDP has signiﬁcantly declined.
This result is consistent with what we obtained in IRFs analysis.
Third, in the source of variation in RMB real exchange rate forecast er-
ror, “own shocks” is the ﬁrst most important and predominant source, ac-
counting for 63–98 percent of the forecast error variance at the horizons of
the ﬁrst to fourth quarters, and 40–70 percent after eight quarters. On the
other hand, the contribution of GDP shocks to the error variance of
REER is negligible at the horizons of the ﬁrst to fourth quarters. In the
medium- and long-term horizon, the contribution of GDP shocks to the
error variance of REER is about 30 percent in model 1, but drops by a large
margin to under 7 percent in model 2 and model 3 and about 12 percent in
model 4. On the contrary, shocks to M2, GDPF, and RUS in the other three
models all have relatively large contribution to the error variance of
REER. What merits attention is that GOV has very little contribution to
the error variance of REER.
In summary, the analyses based on the variance decompositions suggest
that (a) the shocks to the RMB real exchange rate have a large contribution
to the variation in China’s output in models that do not include the U.S. in-
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model that includes the U.S. interest rate, suggesting the possibility that the
spurious correlation between the RMB real exchange rate and China’s out-
put can be excluded; (b) except for the basic model (Model 1), the shocks
to GDP have small contribution to the variation in RMB real exchange
rate, and the contribution is negligible at the horizons of the ﬁrst to fourth
quarters, suggesting the possibility of reverse causation running from the
GDP to the RMB real exchange rate can be excluded; and (c) when the U.S.
interest rate is included in VAR model, the power of REER shocks in ex-
plaining the error variance of GDP signiﬁcantly declines.
3.4.2 Robustness Analysis
The results obtained in the previous subsection may be speciﬁc to the se-
lected ordering of endogenous variables. Therefore, it is interesting to esti-
mate our VAR models with diﬀerent and plausible ordering. In addition,
because all variables in our models are variables of I (1) and there are coin-
tegration vectors for each model, it is worth trying to check the results ob-
tained from the VAR in level models with those obtained from the cointe-
gration restricted VAR models, that is, the VEC models.12 Furthermore,
the results of previous subsection suggest that the magnitude of the ef-
fect of the RMB exchange rate shocks on China’s output is diminished re-
markably by including the U.S. interest rate in the VAR model, therefore it
is also interesting to substitute RUS for GDPF as a proxy of external shock
in our ﬁrst three VAR models. In this subsection we therefore investigate
the robustness of the results as regards these three points.
Diﬀerent Ordering
Kamin and Rogers (2000) adopt orderings a little bit diﬀerent from ours
in their VAR models. Except for GDPF, variables in our four VAR models
are ordered as in Kamin and Rogers (2000) as follows: model 1: REER→
INFL→GDP; model 2: GOV→REER→INFL→GDP; model 3: REER
→ M2→INFL→GDP; and model 4: RUS→REER→INFL→GDP. If we
relax the assumption of price stickiness in the short run, the above order-
ings seem plausible. For example, in model 1, an appreciation of real ex-
change rate shifts demand away from nontraded goods and decreases the
price of nontraded goods and the general price level for a given level of
nominal exchange rate. The adjustment of the price level then causes the
change of output.
We reestimate our four VAR models by adopting the above orderings
and ﬁnd that the results are quite similar to those of previous subsection.
Owing to the space limitation, we only present the impulse response func-
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12. Some economists argue that it is appropriate to estimate VEC model when variables are
I (1) and there are cointegrating relations between them (Engle and Granger 1987).tions of GDP from the four VAR models using orderings adopted by
Kamin and Rogers (2000) (ﬁgure 3.5).
Results from VEC Model
The VEC models to be estimated have following forms:
 Yl
t    lECMl





t i   εl
t, εl
t ~ IID[ol,  l], l   1  ,   4  
where ECMl
t–l   l Yl
t–1is the error correction terms, reﬂecting the long-run
equilibrium relationship between the variables.  l  is the matrix of cointe-
gration vectors. The coeﬃcient vector  l reﬂects how fast the deviation
from the long-run equilibrium is corrected through a series of partial short-
run adjustments.  l
i is parameter matrix of variables in diﬀerences, the ele-
ments of these matrices reﬂect the short-term eﬀect of the variables on a de-
pendent variable.
We estimate four VEC models adopting the same orderings of the previ-
ous subsection. By investigating the estimation results of four VEC mod-
els, we ﬁnd that the IRFs of VEC models are very similar with those of
VAR models in direction and dynamic path of the responses. The results of
variance decompositions are basically similar too. But one diﬀerence is:
the eﬀect of various shocks in VEC models case seems more lasting than
that in VAR models. Taking the response of GDP to the REER shocks as
an example the contractionary eﬀect of an appreciation of REER sustains
longer before the expansionary eﬀect appears. Because restricted by space,
we only provide the results of variance decompositions of GDP and REER
and impulse response functions of GDP from the VEC models (table 3.5
and ﬁgure 3.6).
Substitution RUS for GDPF in VAR Model
When we substitute RUS for GDPF in VAR Models and reestimate the
ﬁrst three VAR models of the previous subsection we ﬁnd that comparing
the original models using GDPF as proxy variable for external shocks: (a)
the IRFs of three new VAR models are similar with those of model 4 of the
previous subsection—the magnitude of the eﬀect of RMB exchange rate
shocks on China’s output is diminished, especially in medium and long-
term; (b) the expansionary eﬀect of REER shocks appears earlier; (c) con-
cerning the source of variation in GDP forecast error, in all three new VAR
models the RUS shocks become the most important and predominant
source of variation in GDP error variance respectively. The contributions
of “own shocks” and M2 to variation in GDP have exceeded the contribu-
tion of REER in the second and third new models; (d) the eﬀects of other
shocks on GDP are similar between new models and original ones. Figure

































































gTable 3.5 Variance decompositions of GDP and REER from VEC models
T S.E. GDPF INFL REER GDP
Model 1
1 1.0 0.6 2.7 0.2 3.1 2.8 30.4 97.1 63.8 0.0
2 1.5 0.7 1.7 0.1 4.2 8.4 29.9 91.0 64.2 0.6
3 2.0 0.7 2.0 0.2 4.0 11.1 35.2 86.6 58.8 2.2
4 2.5 0.8 2.8 0.1 4.5 14.6 39.0 79.4 53.8 5.9
8 3.3 1.9 1.6 0.0 3.7 22.7 59.9 67.6 34.8 9.7
12 4.0 2.8 1.1 0.1 3.3 24.9 70.1 63.8 25.4 11.2
20 5.1 4.2 0.8 0.1 2.8 26.2 78.6 61.5 17.8 12.1
T S.E. GDPF INFL REER GDP GOV
Model 2
1 1.0 0.6 8.3 0.5 0.1 0.4 37.8 95.3 45.9 0.0 7.8 3.8
2 1.4 0.6 6.7 0.8 0.2 1.7 45.6 95.7 40.6 0.0 6.9 1.8
3 1.8 0.7 11.9 2.0 0.3 2.3 53.2 94.2 29.7 0.0 5.0 1.5
4 2.0 0.7 18.4 2.1 0.3 3.0 53.6 92.7 22.6 0.4 5.1 1.8
8 2.4 1.3 23.0 6.0 0.1 3.1 67.0 88.8 7.6 0.6 2.2 1.5
12 2.7 1.5 27.2 10.0 0.1 2.6 67.3 84.9 3.5 1.0 2.0 1.6
20 3.8 1.6 33.0 11.3 0.1 2.4 63.2 82.9 1.6 1.2 2.2 2.1
T S.E. GDPF INFL REER GDP M2
Model 3
1 1.0 0.0 4.4 0.7 2.3 1.8 29.9 94.8 46.4 0.0 17.0 2.7
2 1.5 0.0 3.0 0.4 2.9 7.0 32.1 86.2 33.9 0.2 28.1 6.3
3 2.0 0.0 3.3 0.4 2.9 8.2 39.1 79.6 23.2 0.3 31.5 11.5
4 2.5 0.0 4.5 0.3 3.1 8.9 42.0 76.3 17.4 1.0 32.9 13.5
8 3.3 0.0 5.0 0.3 4.1 9.8 55.8 70.5 5.6 0.7 29.5 18.8
12 4.1 0.1 5.2 0.3 4.6 10.3 58.6 68.1 2.6 0.6 29.0 20.7
20 5.5 0.1 5.6 0.9 4.8 10.6 58.6 66.8 1.3 0.7 29.6 21.0
T S.E. GDPF INFL REER GDP RUS
Model 4
1 0.5 1.0 13.6 1.5 1.0 10.4 12.0 81.5 58.9 0.0 14.6 6.6
2 0.7 1.5 10.4 1.4 0.7 17.1 10.3 71.1 47.8 1.4 30.8 9.0
3 1.1 2.0 14.9 2.0 0.6 17.0 11.3 63.6 34.1 2.9 39.2 14.5
4 1.3 2.5 19.4 1.3 0.6 18.4 9.7 55.8 24.7 4.1 45.7 20.4
8 2.0 3.5 17.1 0.5 0.3 22.6 12.4 43.5 7.1 2.9 63.2 30.5
12 2.4 4.4 12.3 0.9 1.2 26.3 13.9 39.6 2.9 2.4 69.7 30.8
20 2.9 5.6 8.1 2.2 2.7 31.3 14.3 37.9 1.2 2.0 73.7 26.6
Notes: The two columns below a variable give the fraction of the forecast error variance for GDP and
REER that is attributable to shocks to the variable at the given forecast horizon, with the black column
in left indicating the fraction for GDP. The columns below “S.E.” contain the forecast error of GDP and























































































































































































































































Fthe three new VAR models, with RUS replacing GDPF as a proxy variable
of external shocks.
In summary, the robustness analysis conﬁrms that our basic result,
namely that the shocks to RMB real exchange rate have a contractionary
eﬀect on China’s output, essentially does not change even if we adopt the
orderings of Kamin and Rogers (2000) or use VEC model in our model
speciﬁcation. But after including the international ﬁnance linkage of the
Chinese economy, the eﬀect of REER shock on China’s output and the
power of REER shocks in explaining the changes of China’s output turn to
be relatively small, while the U.S. interest rate shock has relatively large
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Table 3.6 Variance decomposition of GDP from VAR models with RUS
T S.E. RUS INFL REER GDP
Model 1
1 0.5 6.8 0.1 24.4 68.8
2 0.8 10.1 3.7 23.4 62.8
3 0.9 13.7 6.0 26.2 54.18
4 1.0 18.2 6.4 25.8 49.6
8 1.2 46.9 2.7 26.9 23.6
12 1.4 58.0 2.3 23.4 16.2
20 1.7 55.7 4.7 20.1 19.6
T S.E. RUS INFL REER GDP GOV
Model 2
1 0.6 8.0 0.0 26.6 63.1 2.3
2 0.8 9.8 5.9 23.9 58.7 1.7
3 0.9 13.0 10.3 25.2 49.9 1.5
4 1.0 16.5 11.4 24.3 44.4 3.4
8 1.2 42.8 7.0 23.4 23.7 3.1
12 1.3 59.1 4.7 17.6 16.2 2.4
20 1.6 54.9 7.6 16.5 19.0 2.1
T S.E. RUS INFL REER GDP M2
Model 3
1 0.5 7.8 0.1 22.3 59.6 10.2
2 0.8 8.6 0.8 18.3 48.4 23.9
3 0.9 11.7 2.2 18.9 39.9 27.3
4 1.0 14.5 2.5 18.3 36.3 28.4
8 1.1 42.9 1.6 16.7 20.1 18.7
12 1.3 60.6 1.1 11.7 13.6 13.0
20 1.6 57.9 1.9 12.1 14.3 13.9
Notes: The column below a variable gives the fraction of the forecast error variance for GDP
that is attributable to shocks to the variable at the given forecast horizon. The column below
“S.E.” contains the forecast error of GDP at the given forecast horizon.eﬀect on China’s output, the magnitude of its eﬀect exceeding that of RMB
exchange rate shocks.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the relationship between the RMB real ex-
change rate and China’s output by using the VAR model technique. The
empirical analysis reveals several interesting ﬁndings. First, even after
source of spurious correlation is controlled for, RMB real appreciation has
led to a decline in China’s output, suggesting that currency appreciations
have been contractionary in China, as traditional open economy macro-
economics forecasts. Second, when the international ﬁnance linkage of
Chinese economy is accounted for, the eﬀect of RMB real exchange rate
shocks on China’s output and the power of the shocks in explaining the
change of China’s output are relatively small, while the eﬀect of U.S. inter-
est rate shocks on China’s output is relatively large. The intuition behind
this ﬁnding may be that the eﬀectiveness of China’s capital controls has
eroded over time and the scales of capital inﬂows and outﬂows have be-
come large enough that external shocks through international ﬁnance
channels have signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the Chinese economy, exceeding the
inﬂuence of external shocks through international trade channels. Third,
besides shocks to RMB real exchange rate and the U.S. interest rate, shocks
to domestic money supply and foreign demand all have important eﬀects
on China’s output. However, government spending shocks have less power
in explaining the change of China’s output.
The conclusion that currency appreciations have been contractionary in
China is remarkably diﬀerent from those made by similar empirical works
on developing countries. The possible explanations of this diﬀerence are as
follows. First, in the existing research on contractionary devaluations
eﬀect in developing countries, devaluations usually take place under an ab-
normal environment of currency or ﬁnancial crisis, and thus have been as-
sociated with economic recession, but RMB devaluations did not happen
in case of currency or ﬁnancial crisis until now. Second, the urban eco-
nomic reform begun in the early 1990s has made many people lose their
jobs and traditional beneﬁts of medicare, pensions, education, and so on,
which has strengthened the motive of precautionary saving of households
in urban and township areas. Under that situation, the income reallocation
eﬀect as well as the real cash balance and the real wealth eﬀects of currency
appreciation may not play a very great role.
Third, China has absorbed a large amount of foreign direct investment
for many years. As a result, the technological progress and production ca-
pacity of China’s manufacturing industry have been promoted rapidly, the
substitutability of home produced capital goods (included those produced
by foreign investment enterprises) to imported goods has been strength-
98 Jianhuai Shiened, and therefore, the eﬀect of RMB exchange rate on domestic invest-
ment spending is not clear. Fourth, one condition that devaluation can
lead to a reduction in national output is that imports initially exceed ex-
ports (Krugman and Taylor 1978). China’s trade balance has been in the
favorable surplus for more than ten years except for 1993, and therefore
does not satisfy that condition.
Finally, because of the characteristics of processing trade in China’s
manufacturing industry and administrative controls on prices (especially
on those of service sector), the supply side eﬀect of the RMB exchange rate
on output is also uncertain. In a word, it seems that the expenditure-
changing eﬀect and supply side eﬀect of the RMB exchange rate change 
are not remarkable in practice until now. Therefore, the eﬀect of RMB 
exchange rate shock on China’s output is mainly embodied through the 
expenditure-switching eﬀect, as traditional macroeconomic theory empha-
sized. In that situation, the appreciations of RMB are likely contractionary.
It is worth pointing out, however, that the conclusion that appreciations
have been contractionary in China does not necessarily mean that China
should continue maintaining the undervalued RMB exchange rate, since
the undervalued RMB has already caused the Chinese economy to run into
internal and external imbalances in the past several years. Figure 3.2 tells
us that China’s real GDP has been running above its long-term trend since
2003, and this kind of deviation is expanding. Indeed, the overheating of
the Chinese economy is obvious. There is no doubt that continuing the un-
dervaluation of RMB exchange rate will further aggravate the imbalances
of the Chinese economy. In fact, the conclusion that appreciations have
been contractionary in China implies that relative to other eﬀects of ex-
change rate change, the expenditure-switching eﬀect has been predomi-
nant in China until now. Therefore, it is eﬀectual to use the orthodox Swan
Diagram to analyze macroeconomic policy issues in China.13According to
the Swan Diagram of Shi (2006), allowing RMB to appreciate is helpful for
the Chinese economy to realize internal and external balances.
In addition, China’s capital account surplus has increased rapidly along
with the rapid increases in the current account surplus in recent years. The
rapid increase in the “double surplus” causes China’s foreign exchange re-
serve to expand in a wild manner and causes the money supply and the
domestic credit to expand passively, which have aggravated the overheat-
ing of the Chinese economy and the diﬃculty in the government’s attempt
at macromanagement. In particular, as China’s capital account liberalizes
gradually and the eﬀectiveness of capital controls erodes over time, the hot
money will ﬂow into China in great amounts, becoming one of the impor-
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13. If appreciations (depreciations) are expansionary (contractionary), the Swan Diagram
is less insightful about the combination of policy instruments to simultaneously fulﬁll both
internal and external balances, because it it difﬁcult in this case to decide where and how the
internal and external balance schedules intercross. See, for example, Frankel (2005).tant reasons the foreign exchange reserve increase so fast. Our empirical
work indicates that the eﬀect of shocks on China’s output through inter-
national ﬁnance channel (as represented by U.S. interest rate shocks) ex-
ceed that through international trade channels (as represented by RMB
real exchange rate shocks), suggesting it is important for the Chinese au-
thorities to handle the capital inﬂows problem correctly. The inﬂow of hot
money in recent years is mainly a response to the expectations of RMB ap-
preciation, and one of the important reasons for the persisting existence of
the expectations is the undervaluation of RMB. Therefore, allowing RMB
to appreciate at faster speed, so as to restore the equilibrium level of RMB
exchange rate, will lessen the expectations of RMB appreciation, thus re-
laxing the pressure of the rapid increase in foreign exchange reserve on the
Chinese authorities.
References
Akinlo, A. E., and Odusola, A. F. 2003. Assessing the impact of Nigeria’s naira de-
preciation on output and inﬂation. Applied Economics 36:691–703.
Berument, H., and M. Pasaogullari. 2003. Eﬀects of the real exchange rate on
output and inﬂation: Evidence from Turkey. The Developing Economies, XLI-
4:401–35.
Branson, W. H. 1986. Stabilization, stagﬂation, and investment incentives: The
case of Kenya, 1979–1980. In Economic adjustment and exchange rates in devel-
oping countries, eds. S. Edwards and L. Ahamed, 267–93. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Bruno, M. 1979. Stabilization and stagﬂation in a semi-industrialized economy. In
International economic policy: Theory and evidence, eds. R. Dornbusch and 
J. A. Frenkel, 270–89. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Caves, R. E., J. A. Frankel, and R. W. Jones. 2002. World trade and payments: An
introduction. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Cochrane, J. H. 2005. Time Series for Macroeconomics and Finance. University of
Chicago. Unpublished Manuscript.
Cooper, R. N. 1971. Currency devaluation in developing countries. In Government
and economic development, ed. G. Ranis. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Coudert, V., and C. Couharde. 2005. Real equilibrium exchange rate in China.
CEPII Working Paper no. 2005-01. Paris: Center for International Prospective
Studies.
Diaz-Alejandro, C.F. 1963. A note on the impact of devaluation and the redistrib-
utive eﬀects. Journal of Political Economy 71:577–80.
Edwards, S. 1986. Are devaluations contractionary? The Review of Economics and
Statistics 68:501–508.
Engle, R. R., and C.W. J. Granger. 1987. Co-integration and error correction rep-
resentation, estimation, and testing. Econometrica 55:251–76.
Goldstein, M. 2004. Adjusting China’s exchange rate policies. Revised version of
the paper presented at the International Monetary Fund’s seminar on China’s
Foreign Exchange System. May 26–27. Dalian, China.
100 Jianhuai ShiGylfason, T., and M. Radetzki. 1991. Does devaluation make sense in the least de-
veloped countries? Economic Development and Cultural Change 40 (1): 1–25.
Frankel, J. A. 2004. On the Yuan: The choice between adjustment under a ﬁxed ex-
change rate and adjustment under a ﬂexible rate. Paper presented at an Interna-
tional Monetary Fund seminar on China’s foreign exchange system. May 26–27.
Dalian, China.
Frankel, J. A. 2005. Mundell-Fleming lecture: Contractionary currency crashes in
developing countries. IMF Staﬀ Papers, vol. 52, No. 2, pp. 149–92.
Hirschman, A. O. 1949. Devaluation and the trade balance: A note. The Review of
Economics and Statistics 31:50–53.
Hoﬀmaister, A. W., and C. Vegh. 1996. Disinﬂation and the recession-now-versus-
recession-later hypothesis: Evidence from Uruguay. IMF Staﬀ Papers 43:355–94.
Johansen, S. 1995. Likelihood-Based Inference in Cointegrated Vector Autoregressive
Models. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Kamin, S. B., and J. H. Rogers. 2000. Output and the real exchange rate in devel-
oping countries: An application to Mexico. Journal of Development Economics
61 (1): 85–109.
Krugman, P., and L. Taylor. 1978. Contractionary eﬀects of devaluation. Journal
of International Economics 8:445–56.
Lizondo, S., and Montiel, P. J. 1989. Contractionary devaluation in developing
countries: An analytical overview. IMF Staﬀ Papers 36:182–227.
Moreno, R. 1999. Depreciations and recessions in East Asia. Federal Reserve Bank
of San Francisco Economic Review, 3, 27–40.
Obstfeld, M., and K. Rogoﬀ. 1995. Exchange rate dynamics redux. The Journal of
Political Economy 103 (3): 624–60.
Shi, J. 2006. Adjustment of global imbalances and its impact on China’s economy.
China and World Economy 14 (3): 71–85.
Shi, J., and H. Yu. 2005. Renminbi equilibrium exchange rate and China’s exchange
rate misalignment: 1991–2004. Economic Research Journal (Jingji Yanjiu), 40 (4): 
34–45.
Sims, C. 1980. Macroeconomics and reality. Econometrica 48:1–48.
Sims, C., J. Stock, and M. Watson. 1990. Inference in linear time series models with
some unit roots. Econometrica 58 (1): 113–44.
Van Wijnbergen, S. V. 1986. Exchange rate management and stabilization policies
in developing countries. Journal of Development Economics 23:227–47.
Comment Ashvin Ahuja
Shi’s main contribution is in his measurement of the extent to which the
RMB-USD exchange rate movement can aﬀect important macroeconomic
aggregates in China. In this regard, his handling of the data is careful and
the result useful to Chinese policymakers.
The results he obtains also gives observers an idea why China’s policy-
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Issues Around the Paciﬁc Rim,” held on June 22–24, 2006 at Kona, Hawaii.makers are so reluctant to let the RMB ﬂoat more in the short run. Shi’s ap-
proach is as solid as can be expected from the classical econometric
method of enquiry, given the time series limitation. Since the chapter has a
nice summary of the history of the exchange rate regimes of China and of
the main results, I will focus on policy implication and the robustness of the
results with suggestion for further research.
How much should China revalue or let the RMB appreciate is the cen-
tral issue in Asia and the world today. China and its currency are part and
parcel of the global imbalances issue, and the relevance to Asian central
banks is beyond question. When a relatively large trading nation such as
China pegs, other central banks are forced to intervene in the foreign ex-
change market quite extensively as well, regardless of their appetite for
such activity. This is evident in the pace at which Asian central banks ac-
cumulated international reserves, starting from 2002.
The chapter does not oﬀer an extensive policy prescription for the
Chinese policymakers on what they should do with the RMB exchange rate
going forward. Having the economy grow briskly with price stability has
helped lift millions out of poverty and raise the welfare of most ordinary
Chinese citizens. Essentially, there is a strong case for China to be cautious
about letting the nominal peg go. It needs to carry the public with it on the
road of market reform. An economic slowdown that lasts longer than nec-
essary can put those reforms at risk. Shi makes this important point. On a
more palpable level, as a dollar peg is one way to anchor inﬂation expecta-
tions in China, a legitimate question is: what is the implication of leaving
the peg or revaluation on inﬂation? Would it imply deﬂation? From Shi’s
conclusion, price stability would not be compromised.
There are policy implications for Asian regional economies as well. In
Asia, one concern is the slowdown in the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
if the revaluation takes place, but there is also another in the excessive accu-
mulation of U.S. dollars (USD), which can make regional economies more
vulnerable when large USD correction comes. Also, Chinese and other
Asian central banks’ dollar reserves buildup has become increasingly harder
to sterilize fully: the sterilization costs have mounted alongside shrinking
central bank proﬁts when measured in dollar terms; a politically important
issue in some countries.
At issue may be not only whether RMB revaluation is contractionary to
China, but also how much of an impact it makes on the regional economies
in the short run. The answer may depend on the timing: if it takes place
soon, when conﬁdence is strong, capital is still ﬂowing in, short-term for-
eign debt is small and reserves are large, the fallout could be more limited,
for example. So, the timing matters a great deal. Taking these standard
variables into account, the model used seems unable to give insight to the
appropriate timing issue.
102 Jianhuai ShiThe approach Shi takes is quite standard and expected from the ﬁrst se-
rious attempt to answer his well-posed question. But as a reader, I am left
with doubt when it comes to a methodology that does not recognize the im-
portance of the diﬀerence between structural relationships between eco-
nomic variables and reduced-form variables. I am also uncomfortable with
a model that suggests that currency appreciation is usually contractionary
or associates depreciation with expansionary phases, regardless of the
underlying shocks or economic and ﬁnancial structure. We have plenty of
examples whereby such associations only exist under speciﬁc contexts, as
acknowledged in the paper itself.
I would also like to see subsequent work asking the same question, but
using an alternative approach, by now standard, which is founded on micro-
economic behavior of economic agents and uses the language of general
equilibrium. It would allow us to probe the question in a deeper way and
be more certain that the Chinese do not make systematic errors in reacting
to (or anticipating) diﬀerent policies over time. We could study the under-
lying forces or disturbances that may aﬀect the Chinese GDP and the RMB
in diﬀerent ways from both the supply and demand sides. These underlying
shocks may also be faced with other regional economies within the same
timeframe. The policy implications may be drastically diﬀerent from Shi’s
under this new approach, as diﬀerent shocks are modeled and their eﬀects
on macroaggregates are studied.
The alternative approach can also aﬀord us an opportunity to explore
diﬀerent policy alternatives under diﬀerent setups. For instance, under a
tightly managed ﬂoating system used in China, what is the implication on
economic resiliency (how costly it is to the economy before it gets to a new
equilibrium) when domestic prices and nominal wages are ﬂexible or not
so ﬂexible? Theory predicts that a recession should be quick and less pain-
ful when prices are ﬂexible. In the context of this unknown (not measured
or documented in the paper, at least) ﬂexibility of nominal wage-price con-
tracts in China, how eﬃcient or how long will it take Chinese farms and
ﬁrms to adjust to an exchange rate shock? This, to me, seems central to the
analysis and a policymaker’s decision.
I’d also expect to see diﬀerent policy responses if the government targets
some sector’s prosperity in particular. For instance, commodity (e.g., farm
product) prices may be set diﬀerently in China from manufacturing trad-
ables, for example. Shi’s approach has its limit. However, policymakers’ de-
cision to allow appreciation at a faster pace may depend on pleasing diﬀer-
ent constituencies at diﬀerent times. Moreover, we need to have the
analysis under diﬀerent policy alternatives in the United States, European
Union, or Japan, which aﬀect what China may do in response.
Overall, I think the chapter is solid, and it accomplishes what it sets out
to do. Policymakers should take heed that Shi’s model implies costly eco-
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With domestic wage-price ﬂexibility, adjustment may also be less painful
than Shi’s model implies.
Comment Dante B. Canlas
The chapter of Mr. Jianhuai Shi empirically assesses the output eﬀects of
currency revaluation in China using vector autoregression (VAR). To be
forthright, Mr. Shi’s answer to his question, which is the title of his chapter,
is a “Yes.”
The chapter departs from two observed imbalances in China’s economy.
One is external, the other, internal. China is posting a huge trade surplus in
relation to the United States and other major trading partners. At the same
time, China is experiencing some serious inﬂation pressure. In view of
these twin imbalances, the exchange value of the renminbi (RMB) has been
placed squarely in the policy hot seat.
The United States, in particular, is pressuring China to revalue the ren-
minbi in an eﬀort to scale up China’s imports. At this stage, however,
China’s policymakers in charge of monetary policy are hesitating to do so
for fear of inducing an output contraction. Instead, China is oﬀering to tax
its exports, ease capital controls, and adjust interest rates.
In aid of resolving the policy debate, Shi opens up a VAR-based investi-
gation of the output eﬀects of the RMB’s revaluation using time series data
for the period 1991Q1–2005Q3. Mr. Shi conducts the requisite tests—unit
root and co-integration—and proceeds to estimate impulse-response func-
tions. One of the results worth highlighting is the GDP decline from a con-
temporaneous shock to RMB’s real exchange value. This result, according
to Shi’s results, wanes after 12 quarters. Granger causality tests conﬁrm
that the eﬀects run from the RMB shock to GDP.
One question that arises as a matter of course from the VAR results is this:
How much of the knowledge generated from the VAR tests translates into
knowledge about the proper conduct of exchange-rate based stabilization?
In other words, do VAR tests have the power to discriminate among alter-
native exchange-rate adjustment rules that would allow people in charge of
monetary policy to determine the most eﬀective rule for stabilization?
This is doubtful even if after doing a decomposition-of-variance anal-
ysis, the researcher is able to rank-order the contribution of various shocks
to the variance of a particular variable, say, GDP. If VAR tests have the
power to discriminate, then Mr. Shi should have been more deﬁnite about
his policy recommendations. For example, would he have concluded the
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in China does not mean that China would continue maintaining RMB ex-
change rate undervalued”? But who is the policymaker in China who is
suﬃciently brave to engineer a revaluation after being appraised by the
best technical minds that such an action would be contractionary?
What I’m trying to do here is counsel caution in extracting policy rec-
ommendation from the results of the VAR tests. If one is bent on deriving
appropriate exchange-rate adjustment measures in China, additional ana-
lytical work is indicated on other real factors that are causing the twin im-
balances. Labor-market factors, for instance, deserve to be looked into. It
is clear that political debates are being fueled by claims of a massive export
of jobs to China, an issue that ultimately ﬁnds its way into the RMB ex-
change-rate debate. Neglect of aggregate labor-market variables like the
real and money wage results in speciﬁcation errors that ought to be recti-
ﬁed theoretically and empirically.
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